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Abstract 
How does explicit instruction affect exploratory play and learning?  
We present a model that captures pedagogical assumptions 
(adapted from Shafto and Goodman, 2008) and test the model with 
a novel experiment looking at 4-year-olds’ exploratory play in 
pedagogical and non-pedagogical contexts. Our findings are 
consistent with the model predictions: preschool children limit 
their exploration in pedagogical contexts, spending most of their 
free play performing only the demonstrated action. By contrast, 
children explore broadly both at baseline and after an accidental 
demonstration. Thus pedagogy constrains children’s exploration 
for better and for worse; children learn the demonstrated causal 
relationship but are less likely than children in non-pedagogical 
contexts to discover and learn other causal relationships.  
Keywords: Exploratory Play; Pedagogy; Bayesian Model 
Learning from Play 
In a preschool classroom, there are few sayings more 
ubiquitous than ‘children learn from play’.  Indeed, since 
Piaget (1929), parents, teachers, and scientists alike have 
argued that self-guided play serves as an important vehicle 
for learning both inside and outside the classroom. 
However, research in the Vygotskyean tradition (1978) has 
placed relatively less emphasis on children’s self-directed 
exploration and more emphasis on how children learn from 
social interactions and cultural transmission.  Surprisingly, 
few studies have looked at how exploratory learning and 
direct instruction interact.  
Specifically, research on children’s spontaneous 
exploratory play suggests that children’s play is affected by 
both the evidence children observe and the children’s prior 
beliefs. For example, children play more when evidence is 
ambiguous than when it is unambiguous, and play more 
when evidence violates their causal beliefs than when it is 
unsurprising (Schulz & Bonawitz, 2007; Bonawitz, Lim, & 
Schulz, 2007; Gweon & Schulz, 2008). However, this 
research has not looked at whether children’s exploration 
differs in pedagogical and non-pedagogical contexts.  
By contrast, research investigating learning through social 
interaction suggests that young children are sensitive to 
whether information was generated intentionally or 
accidentally (Xu & Tenenbaum, 2007), by a reliable or 
unreliable teacher (Koenig & Harris, 2005; Kushnir, 
Wellman, & Gelman, 2008), or in a neutral verses a 
pedagogical setting (Gergely, Kiraly, & Egyed, 2007; 
Tomasello & Barton, 1994).  However, these projects have 
not looked at how children’s inferences affect their 
exploratory behavior.  
  Given that children learn both from spontaneous 
exploration and explicit instruction, how does explicit 
instruction affect exploratory play and learning?  In 
pedagogical situations, it is reasonable for learners to expect 
that the teacher is helping them learn; this expectation may 
facilitate learning in novel situations (Klahr & Nigam, 2004; 
Csbra & Gergely, in press). Learning the affordances of a 
novel artifact is challenging because for any object, there 
are an unknown, and potentially large, number of causal 
properties. If a knowledgeable teacher explicitly 
demonstrates one action and a novel effect results, a learner 
might reasonably infer that that there is a causal relationship 
between the action and the effect. Additionally, if the 
teacher demonstrates only the single action/outcome 
relation, the learner might infer that other potential actions 
afforded by the object are less likely to generate novel or 
interesting effects. Thus in this example, teaching informs 
the learner both about the existence of demonstrated causal 
relationships and the non-existence of other relationships. 
In this paper, we present a computational model of 
reasoning in pedagogical situations, which predicts 
decreased exploration in pedagogical situations. We test this 
prediction using a novel toy exploration paradigm. The toy 
was created to have many different, not immediately 
obvious causal properties. We contrast exploratory play in 
three conditions: pedagogical demonstration, accidental 
demonstration, and no demonstration. If children’s play is 
sensitive to pedagogical sampling assumptions, then in the 
pedagogical condition, children should be more likely than 
children in the accidental condition to assume that the 
demonstrated action is the only causal property in the toy; 
thus, children in the pedagogical condition should be less 
likely to discover other causal properties of the toy. 
Pedagogical Model 
Recent research has contrasted models of pedagogical and 
non-pedagogical settings on learners’ inferences. Shafto and 
Goodman (2008) formalize pedagogical learning as 
Bayesian inference based on the assumption that the teacher 
is being helpful. The learner expects that the teacher 
chooses data, p(d|h), that tend to increase the learner’s belief 
in the true hypothesis 
p(d|h) ∝ p(h|d) 
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where the p(h|d) represents what the learner’s beliefs would 
be after having observed the data. The learner is thus 
inferring why the teacher provided this data.  
Pedagogical sampling can be contrasted with more 
standard random sampling assumptions, which assume that 
which data are chosen do not provide any information about 
the true hypothesis (e.g. Fried & Holyoak, 1984). Random 
sampling contributes only a multiplicative constant to 
inferences,   
 p(d|h) = 1/n  
 
where n is the number of possible sets of examples. Because 
n does not depend on the hypotheses, random sampling does 
not differentially prefer any particular hypothesis.  
Learning in pedagogical and non-pedagogical settings can 
be formalized as Bayesian inference using the appropriate 
sampling model. Learners update their beliefs in different 
hypotheses based on the product of the probabilities of the 
data given the hypothesis and the prior probability of the 
hypothesis,   
p(h|d) ∝ p(d|h)p(h) 
 
where the appropriate p(d|h) depends on whether the setting 
is pedagogical or accidental, and p(h) specifies the learner’s 
prior beliefs about possible hypotheses. These two models 
formalize the computational problems that children face in 
different situations, and can therefore be used to make 
predictions about how behavior will differ as a consequence 
of the different learning situations. Our argument is that 
children understand the inferential implications of these 
situations, and we make no claims about the underlying 
process that generates these inferences.  
In this paper, we assume that the child is inferring how 
many different possible actions on a novel toy have effects. 
In principle, there may be an unbounded number of cause-
effect pairs on the toy. However, for most toys a relatively 
small number of possible actions have novel effects. We 
formalize this intuition using a poisson prior on the number 
of causes with effects in a causal graphical model. Thus, 
learners are inferring which possible causes have effects, 
and how many cause-effect pairs there are, with the prior 
belief that there are a relatively small number of active 
causes.1   
We model the causal relationships using a noisy-or 
parameterization. Noisy-or models are parameterized with a 
background rate and a transmission rate. The background 
rate specifies the probability that a cause or effect 
spontaneously activates itself and was set to zero to capture 
the intuition that the toy cannot spontaneously activate 
itself. The transmission rate is the probability of an effect 
given a cause. A deterministic relationship would have a 
value of 1. Causes may be perceived as non-deterministic 
                                                          
1
 Though the space of possibilities is in principle very large, 
because prior probability drops off rapidly with increasing 
numbers of causes, we truncate the hypothesis space to only graphs 
with up to four causes and four effects. 
for a number of reasons, including if children are unable to 
reliably elicit the effect. To set a realistic transmission rate, 
we coded the number of times that children successfully and 
unsuccessfully could generate the effect when they acted on 
the cause (83% successful actions) and accordingly set the 
value of the transmission rate to 0.83. (However, note that 
results are robust across a range of values.)  
Imagine a child observing either a pedagogical or 
accidental demonstration. Should the child be inclined to 
explore more? The two models generate predictions for 
these situations. The random sampling model captures the 
case of an accidental intervention. In this case, it seems 
plausible that there may be more cause-effect relationships 
to be found, given that a random intervention generated an 
effect. More formally, the fact that the data are sampled 
independently from the hypothesis means that the only 
information that is gained is contained in the results of the 
demonstration – there is at least one cause-effect pair.  
In the pedagogical situation, because the demonstrator 
knows about the toy, the demonstration could be understood 
to be teaching the child about the toy. More formally, the 
demonstration implies information about the hypothesis that 
is being taught. If the correct hypothesis was that there are 
two causes, then the teacher would have demonstrated both 
to maximize the learner’s chances of converging on the 
correct hypothesis. The demonstration of only one cause 
implies that there are no other cause-effect pairs. More 
generally, according to the pedagogical model, the absence 
of evidence for a hypothesis is taken as evidence against 
that hypothesis. Thus, after pedagogical demonstrations, 
children should expect that additional causes are less likely, 
and therefore be less inclined to explore. 
 
Experiment  
If children are sensitive to the differences in pedagogical 
and non-pedagogical situations, and the sampling 
assumptions of the pedagogical and random sampling 
models are correct, then children should infer that there are 
few or no other potential causal relationships to learn when 
they are only ‘taught’ one cause-effect pair.  As such, we 
predict that children’s exploratory play and learning will be 
affected by manipulations in conditions.  We expect that 
children who observe pedagogical demonstrations will 
spend a larger percentage of time exploring the 
demonstrated action than children who observe the same 
information generated accidentally.  Similarly, children in 
the accidental condition should perform more different 
types of interventions on the toy than children in the 
pedagogical condition.  Perhaps most interestingly, because 
of the differences in exploration of the toy, we should find 
differences in learning.  Children in the pedagogical 
condition, who have limited their exploration, should be less 
likely than children in the accidental condition to learn the 
other causal properties of the toy. 
However, differences between conditions may also be 
caused because ‘accidentally’ discovering a causal property 
motivates exploration. That is, pedagogical assumptions 
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may not constrain children’s exploration; rather, the 
‘surprise’ in the Accidental condition may increase 
children’s exploration.  To address the alternative account, 
we ran a third condition called the No Demo condition.  In 
the No Demo condition, children were never shown any of 
the toy’s causal affordances when the toy was first 
introduced, and we expect children to explore readily in this 
condition as well. 
Methods 
Participants Forty-Eight preschoolers (mean age: 58 
months; range: 46 – 74 months) were recruited in a 
metropolitan Science Museum. Sixteen children were tested 
in each of three conditions: Pedagogical, Accidental, and 
No Demo. There were approximately equal number of boys 
and girls in each condition.  
 
Materials A novel-looking toy was created using colored 
PVC pipes attached to a board (see Figure 1). The toy was 
approximately 18” x 6” x 15”. The toy had four different 
non-obvious causal affordances: the toy made a squeak 
sound when a yellow-colored tube was pulled out from 
inside a larger purple tube; one end of a blue tube lit up 
when a small button hidden inside the other end was 
pressed; a small yellow pad attached to the plastic board 
played music notes when different parts of the pad were 
pressed; there were two adjoining black tubes with mirrors 
inside so that a mirror image of the observer’s face was 
visible. All other aspects of the toy were inert.   
 
Procedure Children were tested in a quiet corner in the 
museum. The experiment included three phases, the 
introduction phase, the play phase, and the question phase. 
Introduction Phase.  In both conditions, the experimenter 
brought the toy out from under the table and introduced the 
toy to the child. In the Pedagogical condition, the 
experimenter said, “Look at my toy! This is my toy. I’m 
going to show you how my toy works. Watch this!” The 
experimenter then pulled the yellow tube out from the 
purple tube to produce the squeak sound. She said, “Wow, 
see that? This is how my toy works!” and demonstrated the 
same action again.  In the Accidental condition, the   
experimenter said, “Look at this toy! See this toy?” 
However, as she brought out the toy from underneath the 
table, she pulled the yellow tube out from the purple tube as 
if she did so by accident. Then she said, “Wow that was 
weird. Did you see that? Let me try to do that!” and 
performed the same action to produce the squeak sound.  In 
the No Demo condition, the experimenter did not initially 
demonstrate the squeaking property of the toy. After she 
brought out the toy from underneath the table, she picked up 
the toy and said “Wow, see this toy?  Look at this!” She 
looked at the toy for about 2 seconds (to match the other 
conditions for amount of familiarization time), and then put 
it back down on the table.  
Play Phase. In both conditions, after the child observed 
that pulling the tube made the squeaking sound, the 
experimenter said “Wow, isn’t that cool? I’m going to let  
Figure 1: Stimuli with labeled causes. 
 
 
you play and see if you can figure out how this toy works. 
Let me know when you’re done!” and left the child to play.  
She returned to the table when the child said that he or she 
was done. If the child stopped interacting with the toy for 
more than 5 consecutive seconds without indicating 
completion, the experimenter prompted the child by saying 
“Are you done?” and returned to the table if the child 
answered “Yes”. Otherwise, she let the child continue to 
play and then returned to the table if the child stopped 
interacting with the toy a second time for more than 5 
seconds.  
Question Phase. After returning to the table, the 
experimenter hid the toy behind an occluder and assessed 
whether the child had discovered the four causal 
affordances. First, she produced the squeaking sound behind 
the occluder. She handed the toy back to the child and 
asked, “Did you hear that? Can you show me how to make 
that sound?” The child was allowed only one attempt to 
answer each question.  The experimenter placed the toy 
behind the occluder again and showed the top end of the 
blue tube lighting up while the rest of the toy was hidden, 
and asked the child to show her how to make the toy light 
up. For the third question, she played the music notes 
behind the occluder and asked to play the music sounds. For 
the fourth question, she ducked behind the occluder and 
said, “Wow, I can see myself! Can you show me how to see 
yourself in the toy?” The experimenter concluded the 
experiment by letting the children volunteer any additional 
information about the toy that they wanted to communicate. 
Results of Experiment  
There were no differences in age between children in the 
conditions (Pedagogical, Accidental: t(30) = .4, p = NS; 
Pedagogical, No Demo: t(30) = -.48, p = NS; Accidental, No 
Demo: t(30) = -.12, p = NS). Children played for the same 
amount of time in Pedagogical and Accidental conditions 
(Pedagogical Mean = 120 seconds; Accidental Mean = 94 
seconds; t(30) = 1.04, p = NS).  However, children in the No 
Demo condition played longer (Mean = 192 seconds) on 
average than children in the Accidental condition (t(30) = 
2.76, p < .01) and marginally longer than children in the 
Pedagogical condition (t(30) = 1.71, p < .09).  
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 Figure 2: Model predictions and children’s responses. The 
model (top) predicts probability that of each number of 
causes (0-4) based on the demonstration. The children’s 
results (bottom) show the percentage of children who 
explored exactly 0, 1, 2, 3, and 4 of the cause-effect pairs. 
 
We coded every action the child took on the toy. (That is, 
we coded not only children’s exploration of the four built-in 
affordances but also other actions – shaking the entire toy; 
turning the toy upside down, etc.).  We also coded the 
number of the built-in cause-effect relationships that the  
child could correctly demonstrate at the end of the 
experiment. All actions were coded by the fourth author and 
blind coded by the fifth author; reliabilility was high (r = 
.96) and all discrepancies on the final learning measure were 
resolved by the first author, blind to condition.  To compare 
the children’s actions to predictions of the model, we 
counted the number of children who explored just one, any 
two, any three, or all four built-in causal relations during the 
free-play period. Correlation between the model and child 
results was high (r = .90, see Figure 2).  
Play Results. Children in the Pedagogical condition spent 
significantly more of their play time exploring the squeaker 
toy than children in the Accidental condition (Pedagogical 
Mean = 68%; Accidental Mean = 43%; t(30) = 2.73, p < 
.01). Of the children who discovered the ‘squeaker’ cause 
during the course of free play (N = 7), children in the No 
Demo condition spent significantly less of their play time 
with the squeaker toy (Mean = 22%, starting from point of 
discovery) than children in the Pedagogical condition (t(30) 
= 4.27, p < .01), but only marginally less time than children 
in the Accidental condition (t(30) = -1.86, p = .08). 
 Children in the Pedagogical condition also performed 
significantly fewer other types of actions on the toy 
(Pedagogical Mean = 3.7 actions; Accidental Mean = 5.1 
actions; No Demo Mean = 5.8 actions; Pedagogical, 
Accidental: t(30) = -1.77, p < .05; Pedagogical, No Demo: 
t(30) = 2.47, p < .05).  However there were no differences in 
the number of types of actions performed on the toy 
between children in the No Demo and Accidental conditions 
(t(30) = .79, p = NS).  (See Figure 3).  
To make sure that differences were not driven by the 
slightly longer average playtime in the No Demo condition, 
we also compared the number of different actions children 
discovered in the first minute of play across conditions.  The 
pattern of results held.  Children in the No Demo condition 
explored more different actions in the first minute of play2 
(M = 4.33) than children in the Pedagogical condition (M = 
2.69), (t(26) = 2.23, p <.05), but there were no differences 
between No Demo and Accidental conditions (Accidental 
Mean = 5.09; t(24) = -.88, p = NS).  
Learning Results: As a consequence of the limited 
variable exploration in the Pedagogical condition, we also 
found differences in learning by children in the Pedagogical 
condition.  While children in both Pedagogical and 
Accidental conditions were able to replicate the 
demonstrated action on the squeaker (Pedagogical Mean = 
100% correct; Accidental Mean = 88% correct; χ2 = 2.13, p 
= NS), children in the Pedagogical condition were 
significantly less likely to have learned the other causal 
properties of the toy, (Pedagogy Mean = 20% correct; 
Accidental Mean = 46% correct; χ2 = 6.75, p < .01). 
Unsurprisingly, children in the No Demo condition were 
significantly less likely to be able to demonstrate the 
‘squeaker’ action at the end of the experiment than children 
who had the benefit of the initial demonstration (Mean = 
25% correct; Pedagogical: χ2 =19.2, p < .001; Accidental: 
χ
2
 = 12.7, p < .001). However, children in the No Demo 
condition were significantly more likely to learn the other, 
non-demonstrated causal affordances of the toy (mean = 
40% correct) than children in the Pedagogical condition (χ2 
= 4.00, p < .05), but were equally as likely to learn as 
children in the Accidental condition (χ2 = .383, p = NS).   
Discussion of Experiment  
Our results are consistent with both the quantitative 
results of the model and our qualitative predictions.  Even 
children as young as four seem to be sensitive to 
pedagogical information: they limit their exploration in 
pedagogical contexts by spending more time on the 
demonstrated action and performing fewer other actions on 
the toy; they are thus less likely to discover and learn new 
causal affordances of the toy. Surprisingly, children in the 
Pedagogical condition constrained their exploration relative 
to children who did not get any direct teaching (as in the 
Accidental and No Demo condition) and were thus less 
likely to learn the other causal properties of the toy.  
While there were no differences in learning the 
demonstrated action (the ‘squeaker’) in Pedagogical and  
                                                          
2
 For comparison on this measure, we excluded children who 
played for less than 55 seconds total: 1 child removed in the No 
Demo condition, 3 in the Pedagogical, and 5 in the Accidental.  
Results are not affected if these children are included. 
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Accidental conditions, the non-differences is perhaps not 
surprising. Generating the squeaking action just a minute 
after the demonstration is relatively simple task, so children 
in both groups should succeed in replicating this action.  It 
remains an open question whether pedagogical information 
is more memorable than accidental information after a 
longer delay; or whether pedagogical information is more 
informative than accidental information when the target 
action is more complicated.  
Discussion 
Inspired by the ideas of Piaget and Vygotsky, we set out to 
investigate the implications of explicit instruction on 
exploratory play.  We presented a formal model that 
captures our intuitions about how sampling assumptions (in 
pedagogical and non-pedagogical contexts) could influence 
our hypothesis space about possible causal models of the 
world. Our empirical results suggest that children do indeed 
constrain their exploratory interventions on a toy in 
pedagogical contexts.  As a result, children in the 
pedagogical contexts replicate and learn the demonstrated 
causal relation, but are less likely to discover and learn other 
affordances of a novel toy.   
These results are also consistent with, and can help 
interpret discrepancies in, the literature on direct instruction 
and discovery learning. For example Klahr and Nigam 
(2004) find that direct instruction helps children learn the 
control-of-variables strategy more effectively than discovery 
play.  However, Dean and Kuhn (2006) found that over 
longer term learning, self discovery is an important factor in 
children’s learning; in fact, they found that direct instruction 
is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for full 
conceptualization.  If, as our results suggest, direct 
instruction limits children’s exploration to and therefore 
learning about the demonstrated concepts, then the conflict 
between these projects is not surprising.  Initially, direct 
instruction offers a fast strategy for concept learning.  
 
 
 
 
 However, over time, children who receive only direct 
instruction will be less likely to explore and discover 
relevant strategies, and thus less able to acquire and 
consolidate the relevant concepts. 
Although we have discussed this study specifically with 
reference to pedagogical contexts, teaching is just one of the 
contexts in which children are likely to obtain data from a 
knowledgeable intentional agent. Children may also 
constrain their exploration in a condition where they are not 
being explicitly instructed, but instead just witness a 
knowledgeable agent intentionally acting on a toy (see 
Goodman, Baker, & Tenenbaum, in press, for discussion). 
Although we believe pedagogical contexts are a particularly 
important means by which children learn and the 
implications of these situations for learning are potentially 
quite different (Csibra & Gergeley, in press), our 
experiment was not designed to highlight these differences.  
Future research will focus on contrasting model predictions 
and children’s inferences in these situations.     
It may be interesting to compare this study with research 
on ‘functional fixedness’ (Duncker, 1945; German & 
Defeyter, 2000). Our study resembles the functional 
fixedness studies in that demonstration of a given property 
of the toy impeded children’s ability to discover additional 
properties of the toy.  However, our study contrasts with the 
functional fixedness literature in a number of respects.  
First, we used a complex artifact with many plausibly 
functional parts. It is not clear whether, even in adults, 
functional fixedness would obtain for complex objects: 
many complex objects (e.g., computers) are clearly designed 
to have more than a single intended function. Second, 
children were never asked to generate more than one 
function for any given part of the object.  Thus the type of 
difficulty involved in functional fixedness (overcoming the 
known function of an object) seems less readily applicable 
here.  Third, although preschoolers are not subject to 
functional fixedness (the literature suggests difficulties with 
functional fixedness do not emerge until age six), three, four 
Figure 3. Mean percent of children’s total play time spent playing with the squeaker toy in each condition; in the second 
graph, mean number of distinct types of actions (including squeaking the squeaker toy) that children in each condition 
perform; in the third graph mean number of other causal relations (besides the squeaker) that children learned. 
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and five-year-olds in our study were sensitive to the 
pedagogical demonstration.  The functional fixedness 
literature has generally looked at learners’ latency to solve 
problems of insight learning; that is, learners’ have been 
asked to use an artifact with a known function to solve a 
problem requiring a different function. Here children did not 
have to engage in any problem solving; we simply looked at 
the number of different actions children took in free 
exploration.  Our account also differs theoretically from the 
functional fixedness account: although we accept that 
preschoolers might not adopt a design stance with respect to 
artifacts (German & Defeyter, 2000), we believe that 
younger children can nonetheless make a rational inference 
about object properties given the evidence of a teacher’s 
demonstration.  If children can infer that a teacher 
demonstrated one and only one property because only the 
single property exists, this would lead to limited 
exploration.  It would be interesting for future work to 
explore how children’s assumptions about pedagogy and 
sampling interact with their development of a design stance 
towards artifacts and the onset of functional fixedness.   
Finally, we note that for the purpose of the study, we 
deliberately misled the children: the presumably rational 
teacher (benevolent and knowledgeable) presented only a 
single function of a multi-functional toy. One might wonder, 
are these results simply attributable to poor teaching? We 
think this is not the case. In this experimental context we 
have predetermined the aspects that are to be learned, and 
this set is fixed and finite. However, in most natural 
contexts, the set of concepts to be learned is neither fixed 
nor finite. Indeed, this is why Dean and Kuhn (2006) focus 
on longer-term learning: education requires modifying 
learning goals with time and understanding how concepts 
build on each other. Thus, in natural learning contexts, 
pedagogical demonstrations cannot demonstrate all there is 
to know, and teaching will necessarily be limited. 
Understanding how to combine the efficiency of 
pedagogical knowledge transmission while encouraging 
curiosity and exploratory play is an important direction for 
future work.  
More generally, this research presents a step toward 
reconnecting two historically divergent research traditions. 
Unquestionably, Piaget was correct in emphasizing the role 
of exploratory play in children’s learning. Similarly, 
Vygotsky was also correct to emphasize the importance of 
social learning and cultural transmission of knowledge. Our 
research is an attempt to reconnect these traditions, both 
formally and empirically, by asking how social transmission 
affects exploratory play. We believe a more complete 
understanding of development depends on understanding 
how these processes interact. 
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